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Two studies explored the effect of agency on memory in 3-year-old children 
when learning a sequence in a picture-book format. Previous research has shown that 
with both adults and older children, the inclusion of agency in free verbal recall is a 
central theme. However, very young children are often thought to have poor memory 
for social events because of their verbal limitations. By using a form of deferred 
imitation, Study 1 explored social episodic memory in a non-verbal sequential 
reconstruction task. Children who saw an agent in the picture sequence reconstructed 
more steps than those that did not see an agent present in the picture-books. Study 2 
expanded upon these results by investigating the extent to which agency is necessary 
in order to improve memory, and what properties of the Study 1 increased 
performance. In this study, participants who were presented with an agent in only the 
first and last picture of the sequence did not reconstruct more steps than those that did 
not see an agent present. Taken together, agency may increase memory for a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Our memories make up a vital part of who we are. They provide a framework 
upon which we base current and future behaviors, and allow us to build individual 
identities based on experiences.  In adults, social events appear more salient and 
remembered more readily than nonsocial events (Bower & Rinck, 1999). However, the 
study of social episodic memory has been largely ignored in infant and early childhood 
populations, possibly due to the verbal nature of many social memory studies.  
 This paper focuses on the development of memory for social events. 
Furthermore, it explores the factors that create frameworks for robust early memories 
such as agency and goal-directed activities. By studying these factors early in life, it is 
hoped that we will gain a better understanding of how we remember events in our social 
world. 
Memory & Agency in Adulthood 
 As Patricia Bauer once stated, “Who we are is who we were and what we 
did” (2007). In other words, our memories are the essence of our identity and 
remembering socially relevant events is essential to normal functioning. Studies on adult 
memory recollections demonstrate that there is a tendency to remember events including 
an agent (a living, acting being) over non-agent events. For example, when talking about 
events as adults, personal narrative memories center heavily around agents and their 
related goal-directed actions (Trabasso, Stein, Rodkin, & Munger, 1992).  Indeed, it 
seems difficult to think of a good story that does not involve some sort of motive and the 







include goal-directed actions are remembered at a greater rate and with more detail than 
events that do not include such goal-directed actions (Bower & Rink, 1999) and 
segmentation of video clips with respect to goal completion makes content easier to 
verbally recall than if the segmentation occurs mid-goal (Boltz, 1992). Such a bias is 
even found when describing events that are currently occurring (online description). For 
example, when asked to describe visual events viewed on TV, adults often comment on 
the goal of an object or agent rather than the source (Lakusta & Landau, 2005).  
 Why does this bias towards agents and their intentions appear in our 
memories? In may be that intentional structure provides a framework upon which to hang  
information. For example, remembering each individual physical action of a person 
washing dishes may provide a cognitive overload not conductive to memory storage, but 
being able to effectively group such actions using the larger intention of cleaning dishes 
allows us to chunk the memories into more consumable portions. 
 Indeed, it appears that intentional structure is a very important construct for 
making sense of our everyday world. Without being consciously aware of it, we interpret 
the actions of others as goal-directed and intentional (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). Agency 
and goal understanding also helps as we attempt to process the constant stream of actions, 
events, and information that we must interpret throughout our day. For example, when 
viewing continuous action sequences of a person on video, adults agree considerably 
concerning the boundaries (the beginning and end) of such events (Newtson & Engquist, 
1976). Furthermore, these boundaries coincide with the actor’s underlying intentions or 
goals, suggesting that events are parsed based on a form of mental purpose or goal 







segmentation is also found in reading-time studies, where adults are asked to read action 
sequences and push a button upon comprehension. Findings show that adults pause 
longer at event boundaries containing changes in characters and their goals, indicating 
increased attention and mental calculation at these points (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 
1995). In other words, it seems that conceptualizing events in terms of goals allows us to 
‘chunk together’ the more fine-grained steps in an event (Baldwin & Baird, 2001). This 
leads to greater attention to overall goals and their completion, giving us a structure and 
framework upon which to conceptualize what we are seeing. This may in turn affect how 
well we remember such events (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; see information on Event 
Indexing Model, Zwaan et al., 1995). 
 In sum, it seems that intentions, agents, and goals all allow us to focus in on 
the important aspects of an event, understand it in a social setting, and remember it over 
time.  These features may in turn contribute to increased memory for social events.  
Memory and Agency in Children 
 Interestingly, evidence for goal understanding and biases are found very 
early in life. Even very young infants seem to have the capacity to view others’ actions as 
organized by intentions (e.g. Woodward, 1998). For example, infants can track goals and 
intentions of a human agent toward an object, even if the location of that object shifts. 6-
month-olds who view an experimenter reaching towards an object represent the action in 
terms of the relation between the agent and her goal (Woodward, 1998). Slightly older 
infants (10-12 mos.) can go beyond simple reaches to discern higher order intentional 
relations, as is the case when using tools such as a cane or cloth to retrieve a toy, or when 







Woodward & Guajardo, 2002).  Infants’ tendency to view actions as goal-directed 
appears to be specific to the meaningful actions of intentional agents.   7-month-olds will 
choose a toy after an experimenter has grasped it (goal-directed action), but not when the 
experimenter exhibits an ambiguous action such as touching the toy with the back of her 
hand (Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). Furthermore, infants will reproduce the 
toy choice of a hand, but not of a moving entity that cannot be readily identified as an 
agent (Mahajan & Woodward, 2009). Therefore, it appears that infants can understand 
goal-directed actions only if presented by an agent.  
 Event segmentation conforming to intentional goals is also evident in very young 
babies. In one study by Baldwin, Baird, Saylor & Clark (2001), 10-month-olds were 
shown video clips of an adult performing various goal-directed actions (e.g. bending 
down to pick up a towel and then placing the towel on a counter). If the video was paused 
at an inappropriate time (when the adult was just beginning to bend over) as opposed to a 
goal completion  (once the adult grasps the towel) the infant looked much longer at the 
inappropriate pause. This suggests that, even at this young age, infants believe the correct 
boundary of an event coincides with the fulfillment of the actor’s goal. Much like adults, 
this desire to segment events based on goals may aid in processing the plethora of 
information infants are faced with daily. 
From the above examples, it is obvious that the representational seed for goal 
analysis is exhibited even in infancy. Later, it appears that this attention to agents and 
goals may influence memory. Once they are able to speak coherently, children begin 
using language in the same manner as adults when recalling autobiographical details that 







everyday events that include actions pertaining to goals  (Anderson & Conway, 1997), 
and they often structure this recall in terms of overall goals rather than individual steps 
(Slackman, Hudson & Fivush, 1986).   Indeed, it seems that recall for aspects of an event 
that do not pertain to a goal are often excluded altogether (Travis, 1997). For example, 
when viewing an event where an animate object goes from the source to a goal (e.g. a 
mouse creeps from a bowl to a block), children aged 4-7 years will include the goal but 
omit the source in their linguistic recall by saying things such as “the mouse went to the 
block” instead of “the mouse went from the bowl” (Lakusta  & Landau, 2005).   
 Unfortunately, most information on social episodic memory in childhood 
is restricted to ages where coherent verbal recall is possible. Because of this, it is difficult 
to draw conclusive evidence about preferences for social memory in either preverbal or 
semi-verbal populations.  However, recent research has shown that specific 
methodologies hold the ability to tap into declarative memory without needing language.    
 A method known as deferred imitation has been used widely to examine memory 
in preverbal children. This method entails the presentation of an action on an object, a 
delay period (from minutes to years depending on the study), and a test period where the 
child is then able to act on the objects his/herself (Bauer & Mandler, 1989; Meltzoff, 
1985). Researchers speculate that this method often utilizes declarative memory because 
the ease of learning, fallibility, and flexibility of the memories parallels that of 
declarative memory traits at older ages. Furthermore, preverbal children who take place 
in a deferred imitation paradigm have been known to recall it verbally later in life (Bauer, 







Time and time again this method has depicted seemingly astounding results in 
memory, demonstrating recall even in very young infants (e.g. Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 
1996),  after only one or two demonstrations (e.g. Bauer, 1992; Mandler & McDonough, 
1995), and remembrance after relatively long periods of time (Carver & Bauer, 1999). 
For example, 6 month olds can remember how to pull a mitten off a puppet after a 24-
hour delay (Barr et al., 1996), 10-month-olds and can recall a multistep demonstration 
three months later (Bauer et al., 2006), and during the second year of life many children 
show recall of multistep sequences after as long as one year (Bauer, 2000). 
Amazingly, no one has investigated the various aspects of the events that create 
such strong memories so early in life. Based on previous findings for goal and agent 
biases, a plausible explanation for such robust findings may be the social nature of infant 
memory studies. Indeed, because all studies at this age entail deferred imitation (i.e., 
involving memory for a person’s goal-directed actions), it is almost impossible to state 
whether the impressive results are indicative of memory in general or memory for 
agentive events more specifically. It becomes a distinct possibility that developmental 
psychologists have been inadvertently studying a very specific type of event memory, 
namely social episodic memory, instead of looking at recollection skills in general.  
Present Study 
In order to fully understand how agency affects memory in early childhood, a 
method was needed that could employ declarative memory for social vs. non-social 
events. In an attempt to investigate these various event structures, the present study 
utilized a task similar to deferred-imitation (with a presentation of action, a delay, and a 







critical actions. Study 1 used this method to study the effects of agency on declarative 
memory in a non-verbal format, giving children who are notoriously poor at verbal 
recollection (3-year-olds) a chance to exhibit social episodic memory skills. Study 2 
expands upon the results of Study 1 to further pull apart the specific agentive cues 
necessary to enhance recollection. 
Chapter 2: Study 1a 
Method 
Participants. 
 Sixty normally developing 3-year-old children participated in Study 1.  This age 
was chosen as it represents a time when children are motivated to learn and imitate from 
adults (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), can easily transfer information from a 2D medium 
to the 3D world (Barr & Hayne, 1999; Meltzoff, 1988), and have the memory capacity to 
recall a 6 step sequence (Bauer, 2007). Furthermore, the nonverbal nature of this task 
allows us to study 3-year-olds’ social memory in a way that had not been demonstrated 
previously. All participants heard at least 60 percent English in their daily lives to make 
certain that all instructions in the books were comprehensible. Twenty participants (11 
girls and 9 boys, M=3.03 years, range = 2.82-3.04 years) were read picture books 
depicting an agent putting together an object (agent condition), 20 (9 girls and 11 boys, 
M= 3.0 years months, range= 2.86-2.99) were read picture books where the object 
appeared to self-assemble (non-agent condition), and another 20 (10 girls and 10 boys, 








All data was collected in-lab at a large research University. Upon entering the 
experimental room, children sat next to the experimenter at a table. Each child was 
randomly assigned to either the agent, non-agent, or baseline condition. Children in the 
agent and non-agent condition proceeded through the following stages, with the baseline 
condition only participating in the delay and test phases. The same experimenter was 
present during all study phases in order to control for decreases in memory performance 
due to context changes (for example see Barnat, Klein, & Meltzoff, 1996). 
Presentation Phase. 
Using picture books, each participant was read two stories by an experimenter 
that depicted a 6-step sequence culminating in the assembly of objects (a bunny and a 
tree). The order of book presentation was counterbalanced so that half the children saw 
the bunny book first and the other half viewed the tree book first. These picture books 
varied in two respects, a visually perceivable agent and the accompanying language. In 
the agent condition, children viewed an agent (Sally) at the beginning of the story and 
saw her hands assembling the pieces throughout the sequence, thus providing a visual cue 
evoking goal-directed motives (Figure 1 & Figure 2). The children in this condition also 
heard sentences accompanying the sequence such as “Look, this is Sally! I wonder what 
Sally is going to make!”  or  “Now Sally puts this piece like this!”. In the non-agent 
condition, children viewed pictures devoid of an agent so that the pieces appeared to self-
assemble in a non-goal-directed fashion. The sentences accompanying the non-agent 
condition did not allude to an acting agent and instead stated things such as “Look at 







this”.  In order to eliminate carryover effects, agency was held constant within conditions. 
Therefore, those in the agent condition saw Sally in both books, and those in the non-
agent condition viewed both books without any agentive cues.  
When reading the books, the experimenter used a moving point to bring attention 
to the key objects on each page. For example, when looking at a picture of the ears going 
on the bunny head, the experimenter would first point to the ears and then the top of the 
head to indicate the object (“Sally puts this piece…”) and it’s location (“like this!”).  This 
movement helped to restrict attention to the key features of the step and allowed the 
experimenters to be sure each child focused on the relevant details.  
A page of the book was flipped only when it was clear that the child had attended 
to the relevant picture for approximately three seconds (equivalent to the duration of the 
sentence on the page). In this way it was assured that each child viewed and attended to 
each picture in the sequence. The total time for the presentation phase was approximately 
five minutes. 
Children assigned to the baseline condition did not participate in the presentation 
phase. 
Delay Phase. 
During this phase, a delay period of 10 minutes was imposed and participants 
were given the option to either play a matching game or complete a puzzle.  Regardless 
of the activity selected, the child stayed in the same room to control for contexts effects 








During this phase, the experimenter produced a tray that contained the pieces 
previously seen in the storybooks. The order of test sets was the same as that of the books 
during presentation. Therefore if the bunny book was read first, the objects for the bunny 
would be presented as the first test set. The layout of the pieces on the tray was identical 
to that of the first page of each book.  
Once the experimenter placed the tray on the table, she asked “What can you 
make with these?” and allowed the child to freely reconstruct the sequence in whichever 
way they saw fit. If the child attempted to question the experimenter about how the pieces 
went together, the experimenter admitted ignorance or asked the child how he/she thinks 
it should go together. If the child attempted three times to place a piece in the correct 
location but could not physically complete the step, the experimenter aided in step 
completion. If the child incorrectly placed any piece three times or asked for help three 
times, the experimenter aided in placing the object in the correct location. In this way, 
each child saw the objects completed in the correct manner, whether by their own devices 
or with help from the experimenter.  
Coding. 
Test trials were coded from video recordings by an undergraduate assistant blind 
to experimental condition. Another independent assistant coded 30% of the participants, 
with the two coders agreeing on 97% of total behavioral scores. Participants were coded 
for the number of steps completed (out of a possible 6 for each object, 12 total). 
Furthermore, they were coded on the number of ordered pairs completed (if step 4 comes 
at some point after step 1) and the number of adjacent pairs completed (for example step 







pairs provided information as to how strictly the child encoded the temporal nature of the 
presentation, and whether there are certain groups or pairs of steps that seem to afford 
one another more readily. The total number of ordered and adjacent pairs possible for any 
sequence set was 5.  
Results 
There were no significant difference of number of steps remembered within groups based 
on either gender or age, therefore all the following analysis were collapsed across these 
variables. 
In order to check for equality within sets, a planned-t comparison was run within 
each condition (agent, non-agent, baseline) to test the ease of construction on the tree or 
bunny. There were no significant differences between the number of steps completed on 
the tree or bunny within any of the three conditions (agent, non-agent, baseline). 
 As was hypothesized, there was a significant difference between conditions relating 
to the number of steps the child completed. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of agency on memory in agent, non-agent, and baseline 
conditions (F(2, 56)= 45.8, p<.000). Post hoc analyses using the Tukey HSD criterion for 
significance indicates that the average number of steps completed by participants in the 
agent condition (M=10.8, SD=1.47) was significantly higher than those in both the non-









These results are intriguing and allude to many interesting theories on agency in 
memory. First, it appears that in an instructional assembly task, the inclusion of an agent 
in an event make sequences more memorable. This may be due to the fact that goal-
directed frameworks provide more structure for children, allowing them to chunk 
together information and remember it more efficiently. However, while the non-agent 
group did noticeably poorer during test, a higher rate of variability seemed to indicate 
that certain children used techniques that allowed them to overcome the ‘harder’ 
condition.  
 To further investigate this idea, Study 1b involved coding and transcribing what 
children were saying to themselves during the test phase.  
Chapter 3: Study 1b 
 As is often mentioned in developmental literature, preschool children frequently 
talk to themselves as a means of better organizing both their thoughts and behaviors, and 
directing their attention (see Vygotsky 1958/1962). Indeed, some argue that the 
characteristics of private speech “provide the best insight into the inner properties of 
symbolic thinking in young children”, giving us direct access to the structure and 
strategies used for the task at hand (Patrick & Abravanel, 2000, p. 46) Furthermore, it 
appears that private speech increases in intensity and amount when tasks increase in 
difficulty (Behrend, Rosengren, & Perlmutter, 1989). Therefore, by looking at the nature 
of the speech that children are producing during test, we hoped to be able to gain insight 









 Participants were those children that completed Study 1a.  
 Procedure. 
 The test phase portion of Study 1a was coded by an undergraduate assistant, blind 
to condition, who transcribed and categorized each verbal utterance made by the 
participants. An independent coder also blind to experimental condition coded 30% of the 
participants, with the two coders agreeing on 94% of total self-speech utterances. 
Transcriptions entailed typing the phrase uttered by the child, as well as accompanying 
behaviors (for example “Look this piece is red!” ::picks up rabbit nose:: ). Each self-
speech utterance was placed into one of the following categories: 
 Construction Comments.  
  Instructions:  “This goes on that one.”  
  Names goal: “I’m making a bunny!”  
  Response to book: “It’s just like in the book!”  
  Correction: “Doesn’t go like that.”  
 Non-construction Comments. 
  Names/Describes a part: “It’s like a yellow carrot.”  
  Questions: “Where could this go?”  
  Other: “It’s the monkey’s friend.” 
Utterances not related to the direct task at hand or the objects involved were not 








Interestingly, the overall number of task-related utterances that each child 
produced was not correlated in any way with test scores (r (38)=-.021, p=.90). 
Furthermore, the number of utterances within each category above had no effect on later 
reconstruction scores.  
As amount of speech made no difference in test scores, we next sought to 
investigate self-speech in an ‘all-or-nothing’ manner to see whether it was simply uttering 
any of the above categories at all that made a difference. Therefore, for each of the above 
categories children received a score of ‘1’ if they used self-speech from that particular 
category and a ‘0’ if they did not. For the agent condition, those who mentioned any of 
the above categories at least once during test showed no significant gain over those that 
did not make any such utterances. However, for the non-agent condition, the type of self-
speech used during test seemed to matter. Participants in the non-agent condition who 
verbally recounted any number of instructions (“oh, this piece goes here!,” M= 9, SD= 
3.01) completed significantly more steps than those in the same condition who did not 
(M=3.5, SD=2.12), t(16)= -2.47, p=.025. Similarly, those that mentioned their goal (“This 
will be a bunny!,” M= 10.67 SD=1.03) completed significantly more steps than those that 
did not (M=7.25, SD=3.60, t(16)=-2.25, p= .009). Finally, participants that made 
reference to the book (“This is just how it was made in the book!,” M= 11.25, SD = .25) 
performed better than those who did not make such references (M= 7.57, SD= 3.4), 







Comments related to the task or objects, but not directly associated with its 
construction (naming/describing pieces, asking questions, or other task-related 
comments) had no effect on test scores for the non-agent condition. 
Discussion 
 Taken together, the total amount of talk produced by participants did not increase 
test scores. This suggests that general language ability does not necessarily mean better 
memory performance. The differences in test scores were only found when looking at 
whether or not children used certain categories, indicating that memory does not depend 
on how much you think about an aspect of an event, but whether you think about it at all. 
 Children in the agent condition did not need additional cues such as self-speech to 
effectively complete the sequence. This may indicate that the framework provided by the 
agent increased memory and decreased task demands. It is also possible that consistently 
high scores in the agent condition masked any improvements that self-talk could provide. 
Therefore, given a more difficult task where there was more within-condition variability, 
the effect of self-talk on the agent condition may be more evident. 
  Children non-agent condition only showed increased memory if their self-speech 
alluded to the goals of the sequence, mentioned the events in the book, or guided their 
own reconstruction verbally. In this condition, it was only those that were able to provide 
themselves with external verbal frameworks that exhibited increased memory.  
The behavioral results of Study 1a, along with the self-talk data of Study 1b, 
provide evidence that agency increases memory for an event by constructing a goal-
directed cognitive framework.  However, it does not address how much agentive 







processing explanations may conclude that Sally’s hands provided additional physical 
information that could result in better performance at test. For example, seeing the agent 
pushing one piece onto another in a picture may convey information about which hand 
positions may be most beneficial for completion of that step, which objects are most 
important to attend to in that step, and the relative size of the pieces in relation to a hand. 
All of this information could result in better accuracy at test without tapping into memory 
effects.  
Whereas the talk data from Study 1b suggests that cognitive frameworks are 
necessary for increased memory, a more stringent study was needed to explicitly test this 
possibility. Therefore the goals of Study 2a were twofold. First, it sought to further 
explore the extent to which agentive cues are necessary to increase memory. For 
example, how much agentive information is necessary in an event in order to increase 
memory? Secondly, it sought to investigate whether the physical properties of the 
pictures in Study 1a simply provided more information about manual construction, 
resulting not in better memory but better performance.  
Chapter 4: Study 2a 
Study 2a attempted to look at the effects of decreased agentive cues in a 
sequential memory task. In this study, the agent appeared only in the introductory and 
ending picture. All instructional pictures (showing the assembly of the pieces) did not 
include an agent and appeared exactly as those in the non-agent condition.  Therefore, the 
only visual cue to agency in the agent condition was her presentation next to the objects 
at the beginning, and her reappearance at the end with the finished object. If prior 







should be enough to improve memory. Furthermore, the removal of the agent allows us to 
investigate the extent to which physical cues added in later performance. With this task, it 
is hoped that we will be able to portray a more accurate picture of the nature that agency 
plays on social episodic memory. 
Methods 
Participants. 
Forty-eight normally developing 3-year-old children participated in Study 2a.  All 
participants heard at least 60 percent English in their daily lives. Twenty-four children 
(11 girls and 13 boys, M= 2.95 years, range = 2.79-3.10 years) were read sequential 
picture books depicting an agent on the first page (agent condition), 24 (11 girls and 13 
boys, M= 2.97 years, range= 2.79-3.15 years) were read picture books without an agent in 
any picture (non-agent condition). All children participated in a baseline phase either 
before (N=24) or after (N=24) test. 
Procedure. 
The procedure was the same as that of Study 1 with the following exceptions: the 
agent condition included pictures of Sally in only the first and last page, with all 
instructional pictures void of any visual agent, thus becoming exactly the same as the 
non-agent condition’s instructional pictures (see Figures 4,5,6).  The language 
accompanying the book mirrored that of Study 1. Therefore, the agent condition related 
the object movements to the character (“Sally put this piece here”) even in her absence, 







thing went here”). Thus, for the agent condition, Sally was mentioned verbally in the 
instructional pictures even though she wasn’t visibly present. 
Participants also participated in a within-subjects baseline phase, allowing for 
fewer participants and a more equal motivational ground between the test and baseline 
sequences. This baseline was administered either directly before or directly after the test 
phase, with time of baseline counterbalanced across subjects. In order to accommodate 
this within-subject baseline, while also keeping the number of books read the same as 
Study 1, we added an additional stimulus set that culminated in a bug (Figure 6). 
Therefore each child would be read books on two of the three stimulus sets, with the third 
set used as the baseline. The order of presentation was counterbalanced so that each set 
was equally presented as the first book, the second book, or the baseline set within the 
sample. 
For those children that received the baseline set before test, the delay phase was 
reduced to eight minutes. This allowed a two-minute period for the child to complete the 
baseline, so that the test set was presented after ten minutes. In this way, the time 
between presentation and test was the same regardless of whether the baseline was 
presented before or after test. 
 The existing stimuli were altered slightly in order to better inform the temporal 
order of the sequence. For example, in study 1 the bunny sequence contained two 
identical eye pieces which were placed on one after another, making it difficult to judge 
which should technically come first. In study 2, this issue was resolved by fusing the eye 
pieces and making each step more individually distinct (see Appendix for complete list of 








 Coding procedures were the same as those in Study 1a. An undergraduate 
assistant blind to experimental condition coded all participants from video recordings. 
Another independent coder also blind to experimental condition coded 30% of the 
participants, with the two coders agreeing on 95% of all behavioral scores. 
Results 
There were no significant difference of number of steps remembered within 
groups based on either gender, age, or the time baseline was presented (before or after), 
therefore all the following analysis were collapsed across these variables. In order to 
check for equality within sets, a one-way ANOVA was run within each condition (agent, 
non-agent, baseline) to test the ease of construction on the tree, bunny, or bug. There 
were no significant differences between the number of steps completed on any of the 
three sets within either condition. 
 Between conditions, there was no significant difference relating to the number of 
steps the child completed. An independent sample t-test revealed no significant effect of 
agency on memory in either the agent (M= 7.08, SD= 2.9) or non-agent conditions 
(M=6.63, SD=2.70), t(46)=.563, p= .938, see Figure 7) . Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference between the number of ordered (agent M=3.16, SD=1.83; non-agent 
M=3.16, SD=1.76) or adjacent pairs (agent M=.84, SD=.91, non-agent M=1.3, SD=1.4) 
between the groups.   
Discussion 







agency on memory. It included minimal visual agency cues, with Sally present in only 
the very first and last picture of the sequence and absent in all instructional pictures.   
Interestingly, this minimal amount of agency did not result in better recall at test 
compared to the non-agent condition. Participants in both conditions completed the same 
average number of steps, and completed them using similar temporal orders. 
 These results raise questions concerning the results of Study 1a. Did an agentive 
framework increase memory or was it simply the physical cues provided by the hands? 
Were the scores in Study 2a the result of taking away important agentive cues during the 
sequence?  If the results of Study 2a were based on a lack of agentive reminders, children 
in both the agent and non-agent conditions should show a benefit when using self-
directed speech in much the same manner as the non-agent condition in Study 1b. Study 
2b sought to investigate the nature of participant’s self-speech during test when minimal 
agentive cues are provided. 
Chapter 5: Study 2b 
Methods 
Participants. 
         Participants were those children that completed Study 2a 
          Procedure. 
          Self-speech utterances were coded from video recordings by an undergraduate 
assistant blind to experimental condition. An independent coder also blind to 







97% of total self-speech utterances.  Transcription and coding procedures were exactly 
the same as those found in Study 1b, including use of the same self-speech categories.  
Results 
 Similar in nature to Study 1b, we found no significant effect of overall amount of 
talk on test scores (r(45)=-1.57, p=.344). Furthermore, the number of utterances within 
each category had no effect on later reconstruction scores.  
 As in Study 1b, we also looked at whether uttering self-speech in certain categories 
at all resulted in better test scores than those who did not make such utterances. When 
investigated in this manner, it appeared that certain types of self-speech aided in later 
memory recall for both the agent and non-agent conditions, unlike Study 1b where only 
the non-agent condition benefitted certain verbal strategies. Participants in both 
conditions that provided themselves with instructions completed significantly more steps 
(M=7.53, SD= 2.55) than those who did not provide such information (M= 5.2, SD=2.87), 
t(45)= -2.64, p=.01). Furthermore, children that mentioned the book reconstructed 
significantly more steps (M=8.75, SD=1.75) than those who did not (M=6.42, SD=2.87), 
t(42)=-2.19, p=.034. Unlike Study 1b, there were no significant differences for those that 
did  (M= 7.66, SD= 1.52) or did not (M= 7.00, SD=2.70) name the goal of sequence 
(t(26)=-.41, p=.68). 
 Comments related to the task or objects, but not directly associated with 
its construction (naming/describing pieces, asking questions, or other task-related 








Similar to Study 1b, the amount of self-talk was not found to be important for 
later test scores. Rather, it was whether or not the participants provided themselves with 
instructions or mentioned the book at all that resulted in better reconstruction. All other 
categories of self-speech (naming the goal, naming/describing the objects, asking 
questions, correcting oneself, and other task-related comments) did not increase test 
scores for either condition. 
Unlike Study 1b, both the agent and non-agent condition benefitted from certain 
construction-related self-speech. This suggests that stripping the sequence of visual 
agentive reminders eliminated the goal-directed framework in the agent condition. 
Therefore, participants must compensate by using their own self-speech as a memory cue 
and guiding factor in reconstruction.  
Taken together, it appears that a visual reminder of agency may be necessary in 
all parts of the sequence in order to increase memory performance. In the absence of a 
visual cue to agency, verbal frameworks may support memory in some children.  
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
Across the two studies, we sought to explore the extent to which the inclusion or 
exclusion of an agent in a pictorial event impacted memory in 3- year old children. 
Previous research has focused on memory for agents in verbal recall settings (e.g. 
Anderson & Conway, 1997, ), and thus has often cited pre-school children as having poor 
memory for narrative events (see Trabasso & Nickles, 1992; Bauer, 2007). However, the 







agents in deferred-imitation paradigms (e.g. Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Bauer, 2000; 
Bauer et al., 2006).  Using this conflicting evidence as motivation, we explored the extent 
to which a goal-directed sequence in pictures effects the later reconstruction of the 
sequence in a non-verbal format. This way, we were able to easily test 3-year-olds 
remembrance of a sequence without relying on their poor verbal skills, while also looking 
at the early effects of agency on memory.  
In Study 1, it appeared that providing an agent or character in a sequential picture-
book aided in later recall for the sequence. Children that had seen the event sequence 
assembled by an agent were able to reconstruct significantly more steps than those who 
had seen the sequence without an agent. Furthermore, both the agent and non-agent 
conditions were able to reconstruct significantly more steps than the baseline condition, 
where participants did not view the sequential pictures before test. These results 
illustrated that the inclusion of an agent significantly bolstered later memory for an event.  
Study 2 sought to expand upon these results, investigating the extent to which a 
visible reminder of an agent was necessary for improved memory effects. If only the 
initial idea of an agent was necessary for creating a goal-directed framework of the event, 
including the agent in the very first and last pages of the sequence should be enough to 
increase memory. It was found that removing the visual agent from all instructional 
pictures of the sequence eliminated the memory effects found in Study 1, even when 
verbal reminders remained. Participants in the agent condition completed the same 
number of steps at test as those in the non-agent condition, indicating that the inclusion of 







Interestingly, it appears that all participants in Study 2 dropped to the level of 
performance of the non-agent condition in Study 1. That is, there was no statistical 
difference between the Study 1 non-agent condition (M=8.16, SD=3.44) and the Study 2 
agent (M= 7.08, SD= 2.9) or Study 2 non-agent (M=6.63, SD=2.70) conditions as 
reported by a one-way between-subjects ANOVA (F(2,64)=1.42, p=.249).  This suggests 
that having the agent visible in only the very first and last picture of the book was just as 
effective as having no agent at all.  
As mentioned previously, the possible explanations for these data are twofold. It 
may be that the agent pictures in Study 1 allowed for a continual visible reminder of 
agency, which aided in the ability to see and think about the sequence as goal-directed. 
These reminders were significantly decreased in Study 2, where the visual agent appeared 
in only 2 pictures even though a verbal reminder of the agent remained. If this was the 
case, it would suggest that agentive information increases general memory for the 
sequence. However, it may also be that the agent’s visual cues in the instructional 
pictures provided physical information that helped the participants better understand the 
correct way to construct the object. If this is the case, results suggest that test scores were 
based purely on cues that increase performance instead of increasing memory.  
In Study 1, the agent was present both in the pictures and the related sentences 
(“Sally puts this piece like this!”) resulting in both visual and auditory reminders of the 
goal-directed actions ensuing. In Study 2, the visual aid of the agent was only present in 
the first and last non-instructional pictures, although the sentences remained the same. As 
is shown in previous adult work on instructional learning, the visual aspects of technical 







for the sequence (Kools, van de Wiel, Ruiter, & Kok, 2005). Therefore keeping the agent 
in only the verbal sentences may not have been enough to facilitate a goal-directed 
framework and thus increase memory.   Furthermore, when reading text with 
accompanying pictures, the reader often attempts to visually locate elements mentioned 
in the text “in order to establish referential links” between the two modalities (Dupont & 
Bestgen, 2006). When these two streams of input do not match up (for example, hearing 
that “Sally does this” but not seeing Sally in the picture), a disconnect occurs that may 
effect later memory. Therefore, it may simply be important to have a character present in 
every picture f the book as a reminder of agency, regardless of whether or not the hands 
are on the objects.  
The importance of external visual aids or reminders has long been cited in the 
literature as integral to early abstract thinking and frameworks. Piaget often noted the 
importance of concrete objects when first learning cognitive tasks such as counting or 
conservation (e.g. Piaget, 1964; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Furthermore, external pictures 
have been found to aid in preschoolers’ ability to remember social roles, such that a child 
who is given a picture of an ear remembers that he is supposed to listen and not talk 
(Diamond, et al., 2007).  It is not until much later that these external cues are directed 
inward, becoming “condensed and converted” to more automatic and unconscious 
activity (Luria, 1973) . Therefore, it may be that a constant visual reminder of the agent is 
necessary because many 3-year-old children are not able to automatically construct a 
goal-directed cognitive framework without it 
Another explanation of the data may be that the agent condition in Study 1 







agent may have conveyed information such as the relative size of the objects, or where 
the child’s own hands should be placed in order to piece together the sequence.  If this 
were the case, later reconstruction differences between conditions would be interpreted 
not as memory effects, but as performance effects (those in the agent condition simply 
learned how to construct the sequence more efficiently). However, this low-level 
processing explanation seems unlikely. First, in Study 1 the agent constructs the objects 
away from her while standing behind them. The agent thus used hand positions and 
movements not conductive to the child’s test situation, where the sequence was always 
constructed in a head-on format. However, future coding could explore this option 
investigating the extent to which the children mimic the hand placement of the agent 
during reconstruction.  Secondly, in Study 2 the agent was visible in both the first and last 
page of the agent-condition book, allowing participants to see the relative size of all 
objects of the sequence. This added information in Study 2 did not increase participant 
test scores, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of relative size information for later 
performance.  
 The self-talk data further supports the initial conclusion that increased test scores 
are results of memory, not simply physical performance. In Study 1, it was shown that 
self-talk does not facilitate better memory in the agent condition, presumably because 
they were given the framework of a goal-directed action and thus needed no additional 
help. However, in the non-agent condition, self-talk relating to instructions, responses 
relating to the book, and reporting the goal was integral to better performance. Those that 
were able to provide themselves with a directional goal framework (by naming the object 







the same level as their agent-condition counterparts. However, in the non-agent 
condition, those that did not utilize construction-related self-talk performed significantly 
lower. 
The self-talk data in Study 2 demonstrated further effects of imposing structure 
through speech. As is also seen in the behavioral data, the talk data shows no significant 
difference between the agent and non-agent condition for any category of speech. 
However, collapsed across conditions, certain types of talk were found important to 
sequential recollection.  Similar to the results in Study 1, children who recited 
instructions to themselves (“This piece goes here!”) and who made references to the book 
(“Sally did it like this!”) remembered significantly more steps than those who did not.  
This illustrates the extent to which construction-related speech again helps in 
reconstruction of the sequence. Together, these data suggest that the agent books in Study 
2 were missing an important component necessary to bolster memory. Without being able 
to use a goal-directed framework, self-speech was needed as a supplement.   
Taken together, it seems obvious that, even when the agentive cues are not 
available during the instructional phase, variation in recall is mediated by the structure 
children provide themselves. Explicitly mentioning the agent or goal during the test phase 
resulted in better memory for the sequence, whereas other comments relating to the 
pieces (such as describing the physical properties of the pieces,  e.g. “This is small”) did 
not.   This shows that recalling elements highlighted by the agent’s hands (positioning, 
size, etcetera) was not effective enough to increase performance. However, comments 







Chapter 7: Future Directions & Conclusions 
Further research may be necessary in order to distinguish between performance 
and memory explanations of the data.  One method increasing in popularity with young 
children is that of Event Related Potentials or ERP. This method relies on averaging brain 
waves elicited by a time-locked stimuli during passive viewing.   Utilizing ERPs would 
allow us to view the effects of memory in a passive and non-verbal manner, as opposed 
to having the children show evidence of memory through rebuilding of the sequence. 
Differences in ERPs between the agent and non-agent conditions would, by nature, show 
effects of memory, not performance.   
Other possible directions include exploring additional behavioral manipulations. 
One manipulation could entail presenting conditions where the agent is visually present 
but not acting on the objects, providing a constant reminder of the goal-directed nature of 
the sequence without increasing physical cues. Another possibility could be an agent 
condition where Sally is seen in all the pictures but not verbally mentioned, allowing us 
to asses the importance of the visual versus verbal agency cues.  Future coding projects 
could entail looking at the extent to which children mimic the hand formations found in 
the Study 1a agent condition, or differences in general activity between conditions. 
 The results of these studies help to inform our general knowledge on social 
episodic memory. It seems that, if given a significant amount of agency information in an 
event, memory is increased in young children. However, at this age, the amount of 
information alluding to a goal-direct action by an agent may need to be significant. 
Previous research on story understanding echoes these sentiments. In one study, it was 







were provided with additional information pertaining to a character’s intentions (Yui, 
2002).  Without a significant amount of information relating to goal-directed actions, the 
events in the stories were largely forgotten. Therefore, it seems that it is not only an 
agentive character that is necessary, but also the amount of agentive information that can 











Study 1 Sequence Steps by Set 
Bunny Sequence 
1. Put bunny head on black base 
2. Place white part of eye on the head 
3. Place one pupil on the eye white 
4. Place the other pupil on the eye white 
5. Place one ear into the holes on top of head 
6. Place the other ear into the holes on top of head 
Tree Sequence 
1. Place tree trunk into green base 
2. Place branch through hole in tree trunk 
3. Hang one monkey on tree branch 
4. Hang other monkey on tree branch 
5. Place leaves on top of tree trunk 
6. Place raccoon on top of leaves 
Study 2 Sequence Steps by Set 
Bunny Sequence 
1. Place bunny head on black base 
2. Place white part of eyes on the head 
3. Place fused black pupils on head* 
4. Place nose on head under eyes* 







6. Put fused ears into hole on top of head* 
Tree Sequence 
1. Place tree trunk into green base 
2. Place branch through hole in tree trunk 
3. Hang vine on one end of branch* 
4. Place leaves on top of tree trunk 
5. Put second set of leaves onto end of branch* 
6. Place raccoon on top of first set of leaves 
Bug Sequence* 
1. Place bug body onto pink flower base 
2. Place legs vertically onto white body 
3. Put round head on top of white body 
4. Place wings behind body 
5. Put eyes on top of round head 
6. Place antenna into hole on top of head 
 
* New addition or change in set from original Study 1 stimuli 
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Figure 3. Number of completed steps (out of 12) for agent, non-agent, and 
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Figure 7. Number of completed steps completed at test for agent, non-agent, 
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